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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Virginia B. Theisen *
Stephen R. McCullough **
I. INTRODUCTION
The authors have endeavored to select from the many cases
and bills those that have the most significant practical impact on
the daily practice of criminal law in the Commonwealth. Due to
space constraints, the authors have stayed away from discussing
settled principles, with a focus on the "take away" for a particular
case.
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Appeals and Appellate Procedure
In Murillo-Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of
Virginia, in a lengthy, unanimous opinion, explicitly held that a
criminal defendant in a jury trial waives his motion to strike
made at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case when he
presents evidence on his own behalf.' Therefore, a defendant who
presents any evidence must renew his motion to strike at the con-
clusion of all the evidence, or present a timely motion to set aside
the verdict.2 If he does not do so, the appellate court will not con-
sider his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.3 While the
court recognized that it had previously held that a defendant who
* Senior Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Litigation Section, Office of the At-
torney General, Commonwealth of Virginia. J.D., 1984, Marshall-Wythe School of Law,
College of William & Mary; B.A, 1981, College of William & Mary.
** Senior Appellate Counsel, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia. J.D., 1997, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 1994, University of Virgin-
ia.
1. 279 Va. 64, 83-84, 688 S.E.2d 199, 210 (2010).
2. See id.
3. Id.
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elects to introduce evidence on his own behalf "waives his ability
to challenge the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence in
isolation,"N the court noted that it had not previously "expressly
addressed" the concept of waiver on the merits of a claim which
was raised in a motion to strike at the end of the Common-
wealth's case but not renewed at the conclusion of all the evi-
dence.6
Murillo-Rodriguez, charged with abduction with intent to de-
file, failed to make a motion to strike at the conclusion of all the
evidence, and nothing in the record indicated that the defendant
made a motion to set aside the verdict. On appeal, he argued that
under Virginia Code section 8.01-384(A), and the court's earlier
opinion in King v. Commonwealth,7 his motion to strike made at
the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case preserved for appeal
the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence.8 The supreme court re-
jected that argument.'
The court in Murillo-Rodriguez held that when a defendant in-
troduces evidence after an unsuccessful motion to strike the
Commonwealth's evidence, "he necessarily changes the quantum
of evidence from which his guilt will be determined." 0 The defen-
dant's failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the
conclusion of all the evidence "does not present the same issue as
was asserted in a previously denied motion to strike the Com-
monwealth's evidence."" The supreme court "expressly ap-
prove[d]" the court of appeals' waiver rule.12 Finally, the court de-
clined to apply the ends of justice exception to consider the merits
of the claim.'3
4. Id. at 74, 688 S.E.2d at 205.
5. Id. at 68, 688 S.E.2d at 201. The Court stated that it had previously recognized
the 'long-standing application" of this concept of waiver by the Court of Appeals of Virgin-
ia. Id. (citing Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 705, 723-24, 667 S.E.2d 751, 762 (2008)).
6. Id. at 69, 70, 688 S.E.2d at 201, 202. No transcript of the sentencing hearing be-
fore the court was filed, the sentencing order did not reflect that such a motion was made,
and Murillo-Rodriguez did not contend on appeal that the motion was made. Id. at 70, 688
S.E.2d at 202.
7. 264 Va. 576, 570 S.E.2d 863 (2002).
8. Murillo-Rodriguez, 279 Va. at 68, 688 S.E.2d at 201.
9. Id. at 83-84, 688 S.E.2d at 210.
10. Id. at 79, 688 S.E.2d at 208.
11. Id. at 83-84, 688 S.E.2d at 210.
12. Id. at 83, 688 S.E.2d at 210.
13. Id. at 84, 688 S.E.2d at 210.
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The Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed the issue of the use
of a statement of facts in lieu of a trial transcript pursuant to Su-
preme Court of Virginia Rule 5A:8 and the pitfalls associated
with that practice in Delaney v. Commonwealth.14 Delaney was
convicted in a bench trial of petit larceny.15 On appeal, he chal-
lenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. 6
The statement of facts, however, contained no indication of "what
arguments and objections were presented to the trial court."11 Al-
though Delaney contended on appeal that the trial court would
not permit any motions or arguments to be included in the state-
ment of facts, he had not objected to the completeness of the
statement or challenged on appeal any such limitation by the tri-
al court.18 Because the statement of facts did not contain the ar-
guments made to the trial court, the court of appeals refused to
consider the merits of the sufficiency issue on appeal. 9
In Brittle v. Commonwealth, the defendant challenged the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for petit larceny
subsequent offense. 20 He contended that two of the three prior
conviction orders introduced at trial were invalid to show a prior
larceny conviction because those orders were deficient, failing to
show the checked boxes and judge's signature.2' Although Brittle
made a general motion to strike after the Commonwealth's evi-
dence and renewed it after presenting no evidence, each time
without argument, he did not argue in the trial court that the
evidence was insufficient because of lack of proof of prior convic-
tions.22
The court of appeals identified the issue in the case as whether
the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18 was applicable to save
the issue which had not been preserved.2" The court held that, in
14. 55 Va. App. 64, 68, 683 S.E.2d 834, 836 (2009) (construing VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 5A,
R. 5A:8 (Repl. Vol. 2010)).
15. Id. at 66-67, 683 S.E.2d at 835.
16. Id. at 66, 683 S.E.2d at 835.
17. Id. at 67, 683 S.E.2d at 835-36.
18. Id., 683 S.E.2d at 836.
19. See id. at 68-69, 683 S.E.2d at 836.
20. 54 Va. App. 505, 509, 680 S.E.2d 335, 337 (Ct. App. 2009).
21. Id. at 511, 680 S.E.2d at 338. A third order, and latest in time, reflected that Brit-
tle had been convicted of petit larceny second offense. Id. at 510, 680 S.E.2d at 338. Brittle
did not contend on appeal that this order was deficient. See id. at 511, 680 S.E.2d at 338.
22. Id. at 511, 680 S.E.2d at 338.
23. Id. at 512, 680 S.E.2d at 339 (construing VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 5A, R. 5A:18 (Repl.
2010] 247
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order for it to apply the ends of justice exception, Brittle was re-
quired to show: "(1) that the trial court erred, and (2) that a grave
or manifest injustice will occur or the appellant will be denied es-
sential rights." The court of appeals reiterated its earlier hold-
ings that, where a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence has
not been preserved at trial, in order to show a manifest injustice,
the burden is higher than simply showing that the evidence was
insufficient. 2 5 The test when examining whether a miscarriage of
justice has occurred is, rather, "'whether the record contains af-
firmative evidence of innocence or lack of a criminal offense."'26
The court found that the record in Brittle's case did not contain
such evidence and refused to apply the exception to Rule 5A: 18.27
In Roberson v. Commonwealth28 and Ghameshlouy v. Com-
monwealth29 the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed prosecu-
tions brought under local ordinances, where the locality was not
named in the notice of appeal from the trial court to the court of
appeals. The procedural posture of the two cases was somewhat
different and critically led to different results on appeal.
In Roberson, the defendant was convicted in general district
court of driving under the influence ("DUI") under a local ordin-
ance. 0 He appealed the judgment to the circuit court and was
convicted of DUI in that court." The style of the final order re-
cited that the City of Virginia Beach was the prosecuting entity,
but the order referenced only Code section 18.2-266, not the local
ordinance.3 2 The notice of appeal listed the Commonwealth, not
the City, as the appellee.3 3 The statement of facts entered in the
case in lieu of a transcript did not reference the municipal ordin-
ance, nor did the petition for appeal or brief in opposition.34 The
Vol. 2010)).
24. Id. at 513, 680 S.E.2d at 339.
25. Id. at 514, 680 S.E.2d at 340.
26. Id. at 517, 680 S.E.2d at 341 (quoting Tooke v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 759,
765, 627 S.E.2d 533, 536 (Ct. App. 2006)).
27. Id. at 520, 680 S.E.2d at 343.
28. (Roberson II), 279 Va. 396, 399-400, 689 S.E.2d 706, 708 (2010).
29. (Ghameshlouy II), 279 Va. 379, 383, 689 S.E.2d 698, 699 (2010).
30. Roberson v. City of Va. Beach (Roberson 1), 53 Va. App. 666, 668, 674 S.E.2d 569,
570 (Ct. App. 2009).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 668, 674 S.E.2d at 570.
34. Roberson II, 279 Va. at 400, 689 S.E.2d at 708-09.
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petition for appeal and brief in opposition filed in the matter
listed the Commonwealth as the appellee."
However, when the court of appeals granted the appeal, it re-
styled the case to include the City and the Commonwealth as the
appellee.36 The Office of the Attorney General filed a motion seek-
ing correction of the final order under Code section 8.01-428(B).37
Upon being granted leave by the appellate court to address the
motion, however, the circuit court ruled that no correction was
necessary; the case had been prosecuted under the city ordin-
ance.38 The court of appeals subsequently dismissed the appeal for
want of jurisdiction, based on the defendant's failure to name an
indispensable party in the notice of appeal.39 Roberson appealed.
The Supreme Court of Virginia granted the appeal and instructed
the City and the Commonwealth to appear, directing each to an-
swer whether it was the proper appellee.40
The defendant argued on appeal in the supreme court that he
was in fact convicted under the State Code and thus, the notice of
appeal properly named the Commonwealth as the appellee.41 The
supreme court disagreed, noting that the controlling documents
at trial indicated that the City was the prosecuting authority and
that Roberson was charged with a violation of the local ordin-
ance.42 While the final order did not refer to the local ordinance,
the reference to Code section 18.2-266 identified the statute as be-
ing incorporated into the City Code.4
The supreme court, contrary to the conclusion of the Common-
wealth, the City, and the court of appeals, held that the failure to
identify a necessary appellee in the notice of appeal did not auto-
matically deprive the appellate courts of jurisdiction, but was a
defect that could be waived.44 However, the court held that Rober-
son's notice of appeal failed to sufficiently identify the offense be-
ing appealed as the conviction for DUI under the local ordin-
35. Id.
36. Id. at 400-01, 689 S.E.2d at 709.
37. Roberson I, 53 Va. App. at 668, 670, 674, S.E.2d at 570, 571.
38. Id. at 669, 674 S.E.2d at 570.
39. See id. at 670, 671, 674 S.E.2d at 571.
40. Roberson II, 279 Va. at 403, 689 S.E.2d at 710.
41. Id. at 405-06, 689 S.E.2d at 711-12.
42. Id. at 406, 689 S.E.2d at 712.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 407, 689 S.E.2d at 713.
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ance.4 1 Thus, while the supreme court did not agree with the court
of appeals' rationale for reaching the same result, the supreme
court agreed the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction over
the appeal of Roberson's conviction for DUI under the local ordin-
ance, and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.46
In Ghameshlouy, the defendant was convicted of state charges
as well as a violation of a local ordinance prohibiting failure to
identify oneself when asked by a law enforcement officer."7 The
notice of appeal in that case, while identifying the Common-
wealth as the only appellee, expressly stated that the conviction
had been obtained under the local ordinance .4 In the court of ap-
peals, Ghameshlouy acknowledged that there was a defect in the
notice of appeal but argued that any objection to that defect had
been waived by the participation of the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney along with the Attorney General after the appeal had been
granted.4* A divided panel of the court of appeals dismissed the
appeal.o
The supreme court noted that it had "never required that a no-
tice of appeal be precise, accurate, and correct in every detail be-
fore the appellate court can acquire jurisdiction over the case."5'
The supreme court found that the notice of appeal Ghameshlouy
filed, although defective, "was sufficient to cause the potential ju-
risdiction of the court of appeals to consider such appeals to ripen
into active jurisdiction over this specific case."52 The court found
that the defect in the notice of appeal in not naming the proper
appellee was waived in this case.53 Thus, the supreme court re-
versed the court of appeals' dismissal of the case and remanded
the matter to the court of appeals for further proceedings.54
45. Id. at 408, 689 S.E.2d at 713.
46. Id.
47. Ghameshlouy II, 279 Va. 379, 383, 689 S.E.2d 698, 699 (2010).
48. Id. at 385, 689 S.E.2d at 700-01.
49. Ghameshlouy v. Commonwealth (Ghameshlouy 1), 54 Va. App. 47, 54-55, 679
S.E.2d 854, 857-58 (Ct. App. 2009), reu'd, 279 Va. 379, 689 S.E.2d 699 (2010).
50. Id. at 51, 675 S.E.2d at 856.
51. Ghameshlouy II, 279 Va. at 391, 689 S.E.2d at 704.
52. Id. at 394, 689 S.E.2d at 705.
53. Id. at 394, 689 S.E.2d at 706.
54. Id. at 395, 689 S.E.2d at 706. In an unpublished opinion issued September 14,
2010, the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed and dismissed the defendant's conviction.
Ghameshlouy v. City of Va. Beach, No. 1882-07-1, slip op. at 5 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 14,
2010) (Virginia Beach City).
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B. Arraignment
Lynell Butler Simmons argued on appeal that his conviction for
attempted murder was void because he had not been arraigned on
that charge or entered a plea to it at his jury trial.5 5 In Simmons
v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected the
argument.56
Simmons was arraigned on numerous charges, including use of
a firearm in the attempted murder of Jamar Blackwell.57 He en-
tered pleas of "not guilty" to the charges and requested trial by
jury.58 He was not, however, arraigned on the attempted murder
charge.59 The "trial court and the parties apparently proceeded
under the assumption" that Simmons had been arraigned on the
attempted murder charge and he pled not guilty to that charge,
as he had to the others.6 0 The court instructed the jury on the at-
tempted murder charge, counsel argued at length regarding that
charge, and the jury completed a separate verdict form for that
charge.6' The final order contained the general recitation that the
defendant was arraigned, had pled not guilty, and had requested
a trial by jury."
In rejecting Simmons' contention that his conviction for at-
tempted murder was void, the court of appeals held that "a de-
fendant who understands the nature of the charges against him
and defends against them may not void his conviction based upon
the absence of a formal arraignment."63 The court found that ar-
raignment may be waived, and concluded that a failure to arraign
may result in a reversal of a conviction if a timely and proper ob-
55. Simmons v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 594, 596, 681 S.E.2d 56, 57 (Ct. App.
2009).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 597, 681 S.E.2d at 57.
59. Id. at 596-97, 681 S.E.2d at 57.
60. Id. at 597, 681 S.E.2d at 57.
61. Id. at 597-98, 681 S.E.2d at 57-58.
62. Id. at 598, 681 S.E.2d at 58.
63. Id. at 602, 681 S.E.2d at 60.
2010] 251
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jection is presented to the trial court.4 Here, the defendant
waived any such objection.66
C. Jury Issues
A jury loses power over its guilty verdict only when it is dis-
charged from service at the close of trial.66 At the guilt phase of
jury trial in Weeks v. Commonwealth, the jury convicted Weeks of
conspiracy to commit grand larceny and misdemeanor conceal-
ment.67 During the penalty phase deliberations, however, the jury
sent a note to the trial judge which advised him that, upon hear-
ing the sentencing instructions, the jury realized the conspiracy
charge was a felony, a fact it had not recognized when returning
the guilty phase verdict.68 The jury asked the court, "What should
we do? We thought it was a misdemeanor."69
The court, with the concurrence of both counsel, responded that
the jury had convicted the defendant of two offenses and should
impose such punishment as it found just for those offenses.7o The
jury sent a second note out to the court indicating jurors thought
they could not have convicted Weeks of the conspiracy charge un-
less he stole property worth $200 or more, a fact upon which they
had not agreed.7' The court and jury exchanged additional notes.7 1
The trial court then declined to answer yet another question from
the jury and did not rule on Weeks's motion for mistrial.7 3 The
jury next asked if it could change its verdict on "the larceny
charge."7 4 The court did not rule on the defendant's new mistrial
motion and did not answer the jury's question.75 The jury sent ad-
ditional notes to the court about its concerns.76 After the jury re-
64. Id. at 606, 681 S.E.2d at 62.
65. Id.
66. See Weeks v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 157, 162-63, 684 S.E.2d 829, 832 (Ct.
App. 2009).
67. Id. at 160, 684 S.E.2d at 831.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 160, 684 S.E.2d at 831.
72. Id. at 160-61, 684 S.E.2d at 831.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 161, 684 S.E.2d at 831.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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turned a sentence, the court denied Weeks's motion to set aside
the verdict."
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred.76 The court
noted that the jurors, without any prompting, volunteered that
they misread and misunderstood the conspiracy instruction, and
sought to reconsider the guilty verdict rendered on that charge."
Thus, under "these unique circumstances, the trial court abused
its discretion by failing either to declare a mistrial or to set aside
the verdict." 0
The defendant in Cokes v. Commonwealth initially waived his
right to trial by jury."' On the morning of trial, he made a request
for a jury.82 The trial court refused the request.8 3 The Supreme
Court of Virginia reversed.4 The court observed that:
[T]he record in this case fails to disclose that the motion was made
solely for the purpose of delay or whether, in the ordinary course of
the circuit court's operation, Cokes' request for a jury trial could
have been accommodated at the time it was made. The record also
fails to disclose the number of witnesses who would be inconve-
nienced by the continuance, or the difficulty rescheduling the trial
would present to those witnesses."
The barrenness of the record, the court observed, "leaves this
court to speculate whether Cokes's request could have been hon-
ored in a timely fashion, thereby vindicating his constitutional
and statutory rights without impeding the administration of jus-
tice."8 6 The court stressed that it was not seeking to undermine
the broad discretion of trial courts in this area.87 Rather, it sought
77. Id. at 161-62, 684 S.E.2d at 831.
78. Id. at 165, 684 S.E.2d at 833.
79. Id. at 164, 684 S.E.2d at 833. The court noted that "[i]t only makes matters worse
that the jurors were more confused than they even knew." Id.
80. Id. at 165, 684 S.E.2d at 833.
81. 280 Va. 92, 95, 694 S.E.2d 582, 583-84 (2010).
82. Id. at 96, 694 S.E.2d at 584.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 99, 694 S.E.2d at 586.
85. Id. at 98, 694 S.E.2d at 585.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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to make clear that the basis of a court's determination must be
made on the record."
Cokes serves as a reminder of the importance of fashioning a
record when denying even late requests for a jury trial.
D. Miranda
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Anderson v. Commonwealth
applied the public safety exception to the Miranda rule an-
nounced by the United States Supreme Court in New York v.
Quarles,89 in affirming the trial court's denial of the defendant's
suppression motion."
In Anderson, the defendant fled from a police officer in a public
housing apartment complex during the afternoon hours.1 As he
ran, Anderson tossed an object that the officer soon recognized
was a gun.92 As the officer apprehended Anderson, he asked him if
the gun was loaded.93 Anderson replied that there was a bullet in
the gun.94 Subsequently, after another officer arrived and a crimi-
nal check was run, Anderson was arrested for possession of a
firearm by convicted felon.95 He was advised of his Miranda rights
and gave a statement to the police about his possession of the
gun.,6 The trial court denied Anderson's motion to suppress his
statements.9 7 He then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserv-
ing his claim that the court erred in denying the suppression mo-
tion.9"
On appeal, as he had at trial, Anderson argued that the officer
violated the rule in Miranda when he asked Anderson if the gun
was loaded.99 He also alleged that the officer's error tainted the
later statement Anderson gave after receiving Miranda warn-
88. Id.
89. 467 U.S. 649, 659 (1984).
90. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 85, 92-93, 688 S.E.2d 605, 608-09 (2010).
91. Id. at 88, 688 S.E.2d at 606.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 88-89, 688 S.E.2d at 606.
96. Id. at 89, 688 S.E.2d at 606.
97. Id.
98. Id., 688 S.E.2d at 607.
99. Id. at 91, 688 S.E.2d at 608.
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ings.oo Anderson argued that the Quarles public safety exception
to Miranda did not apply because that exception was limited to
situations where the police do not know the location of a poten-
tially dangerous weapon, a scenario not present here.101
The supreme court held that the officer's question of whether
the gun was loaded was "objectively reasonable" to protect him-
self and the public from dangers associated with the weapon.102
The court recognized that the "prototypical example" for applica-
tion of the public safety exception is the situation where the wea-
pon is missing.o3 The court held, however, that nothing in
Quarles limits application of the exception to questions about
missing weapons. 04
E. Plea Agreements
In Harris v. Commonwealth the defendant, who was charged
with possession of heroin, entered into a plea agreement, which
provided that Harris would seek admission into a "drug treat-
ment court program."1o5 Under the agreement, if Harris success-
fully completed the program, the charge would be dismissed.1 o6
The plea "agreement also provided that violations of the condi-
tions 'may result in ... dismissal from the program and the impo-
sition of the sentence' contained in the agreement."o'0 Harris was
terminated from the program and the circuit court set a sentenc-
ing date."o' At that hearing, Harris argued that he had not re-
ceived notice or opportunity to be heard regarding the termina-
tion decision.09
The supreme court held that, like a probationer or parolee,
Harris had a "liberty interest" dependent upon his compliance
100. Id. at 92, 688 S.E.2d at 608.
101. Id. at 91-92, 688 S.E.2d at 608.
102. Id. at 93, 688 S.E.2d at 609.
103. Id. at 92, 688 S.E.2d at 608.
104. Id. The court noted that it was only after arresting Anderson and advising him of
his rights under Miranda that the officer asked "investigatory questions about Anderson's
possession of the gun." Id. at 93, 688 S.E.2d at 609.
105. 279 Va. 541, 543, 689 S.E.2d 713, 714 (2010).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 543-544, 689 S.E.2d at 714.
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with certain conditions."0 Accordingly, "before that interest
[could] be revoked, Harris was entitled to an orderly process pro-
viding him notice and an opportunity to be heard."", Under the
terms of the plea agreement, termination from the drug treat-
ment court program would be a "significant factor" in a decision
by the court "to impose the terms of the agreement and revoke
Harris' liberty." 2 Therefore, because Harris had no opportunity
to participate in the termination process, the trial court's refusal
to consider evidence of the reasons for the termination was er-
ror.113
F. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The Court of Appeals of Virginia considered in Rivera-Padilla
v. Commonwealth whether incriminating statements by the de-
fendant, taken during an interview about whether the defendant
should continue to receive welfare benefits, violated her right to
avoid self-incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment." The
Department of Social Services ("DSS") learned that Rivera-
Padilla might be working without reporting those wages."5 DSS
then interviewed her to determine whether her children re-
mained eligible for Medicaid benefits."6 During the course of the
interview, she admitted that she had worked under an assumed
name, and that she lied about the income so that she would con-
tinue to receive benefits."7 She was convicted of welfare fraud."8
In analyzing the Fifth Amendment issue, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia first noted that, in general, the privilege against self-
incrimination is one that a defendant must raise or it will be
waived."9 An exception to this general rule applies in situations
where asserting the privilege triggers a penalty.120 Rivera-Padilla
acknowledged that she did not invoke the privilege, but con-
110. Id. at 545, 689 S.E.2d at 715.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 546, 689 S.E.2d at 716.
113. Id.
114. 55 Va. App. 304, 307, 685 S.E.2d 851, 852-53 (Ct. App. 2009).
115. Id., 685 S.E.2d at 853.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 308, 685 S.E.2d at 853.
118. Id. at 307, 685 S.E.2d at 852.
119. Id. at 309-10, 685 S.E.2d at 854.
120. Id. at 310-11, 685 S.E.2d at 854 (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429
(1984)).
256 [Vol. 45:245
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
tended that she faced a penalty, the loss of welfare benefits, if she
invoked the privilege.121 The court of appeals found the penalty
exception inapplicable because Rivera-Padilla was never told that
her benefits would be terminated if she invoked the privilege.122
The court reasoned that
"for purposes of [the penalty] exception, one must distinguish situa-
tions where a person will be penalized for the very act of asserting
the privilege (e.g., the person will lose their job if they assert the pri-
vilege, regardless of the other evidence in the case) from situations
where a person is free to assert the privilege but they then run the
risk that, based on the remaining evidence, the court or administra-
tive agency will decide the case against them. The exception applies
only to the former situation, not the latter."2 3
G. Right to Expert or Investigative Assistance
In Dowdy v. Commonwealth,124 the Supreme Court of Virginia
examined the interaction of two cases dealing with the appoint-
ment of expert witnesses for indigent defendants: Ake v. Oklaho-
ma 2 5 and Husske v. Commonwealth. 2 6 In Husske, the Court held
that "an indigent defendant who seeks the appointment of an ex-
pert witness, at the Commonwealth's expense, must demonstrate
that the subject which necessitates the assistance of the expert is
'likely to be a significant factor in his defense,' and that he will be
prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance."2 7
The defendant in Dowdy claimed that the requirement that a
defendant make a preliminary showing of prejudice went beyond
and conflicted with the decision in Ake.m12 After parsing both deci-
sions, the Supreme Court of Virginia found no conflict. The court
observed that Ake was concerned that, in certain cases, the de-
fense "may be devastated by the absence" of expert psychiatric
help.129 The court concluded that such language is similar to the
121. Id. at 311, 685 S.E.2d at 854-55.
122. Id., 685 S.E.2d at 855.
123. Id. at 314, 685 S.E.2d at 856 (quoting State v. Rivers, 146 P.3d 999, 1005 (Alaska
Ct. App. 2006)).
124. 278 Va. 577, 581, 686 S.E.2d 710, 712 (2009).
125. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
126. 252 Va. 203, 476 S.E.2d 920 (1996).
127. Id. at 211-12, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83)).
128. Dowdy, 278 Va. at 591, 688 S.E.2d at 718.
129. Id. at 593, 688 S.E.2d at 719 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 83).
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requirement in Husske that the defendant show prejudice.130 The
court noted an abundance of persuasive authority from other
courts that interpret Ake in a similar manner.13' The court ob-
served that the "prejudice requirement [in Husske] merely directs
a trial court to determine, based on the facts of the particular
case, the probable value of providing the requested assistance and
the risk of error in the criminal proceeding if such is not pro-
vided."132 Finally, the court held that, under the circumstances of
the case, the trial court did not err in concluding that the defen-
dant had failed to meet the demanding showing required to estab-
lish a particularized need for investigative assistance.'33
H. Confrontation Clause
Whether evidence is "testimonial" is now the critical threshold
question for whether evidence triggers the Confrontation
Clause.134 In Wilder v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia examined whether a 911 call reporting a larceny that
had just taken place was testimonial evidence. 135 The caller stated
that he observed two individuals break into a fenced area and
stated they were carting things away.'3 The court declined to
broadly hold that any ongoing felony constituted an ongoing
emergency.137 Four factors, distilled from Davis v. Washington,35
guided the court's analysis:
(1) Was the declarant speaking about current events as they were ac-
tually happening, "requiring police assistance" rather than describ-
ing past events?
(2) Would a "reasonable listener" conclude that the declarant was
facing an ongoing emergency that called for [immediate] help?
(3) Was the nature of what was asked and answered during the
course of a 911 call such that, "viewed objectively, the elicited state-
ments were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency"
rather than "simply to learn .. . what had happened in the past?"
130. Id. (citing Husske, 252 Va. at 212, 476 S.E.2d at 925).
131. Id. at 593-94, 688 S.E.2d at 719 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 593, 688 S.E.2d at 719.
133. Id. at 594-98, 688 S.E.2d at 720-22.
134. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
135. 55 Va. App. 579, 589, 687 S.E.2d 542, 547 (2010).
136. Id. at 583, 687 S.E.2d at 544.
137. Id. at 591, 687 S.E.2d at 548.
138. 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
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(4) What was the "level of formality" of the interview? For example,
was the caller frantic, in an environment that was neither tranquil
nor safe?" 9
The key factor for the court was (3) above: whether the caller or
the public were in danger of harm. 0 Applying these factors, the
court held that the 911 call was testimonial in nature.14 ' Although
the caller was speaking about current events, the caller was not
facing any immediate physical danger, nor was there any danger
to the public generally.142 Therefore, admitting the 911 tape into
evidence violated the defendant's confrontation rights.14
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Automobile Exception
In Duncan v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
re-affirmed the well-established rule that the automobile excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment justifies a warrantless search of
the entire automobile when the police have probable cause to be-
lieve that the vehicle contains contraband.14 The police initially
stopped Duncan's Ford Ranger for a muffler violation.145 Once
Duncan was stopped, the police learned that his driver's license
was suspended.146 Although Duncan told the police at first that
there were no drugs or weapons in the vehicle, when the officer
said he was going to have the vehicle towed, Duncan said there
"may" be a gun under the seat.14 7 As Duncan got out of the vehicle
he admitted that he had a knife on his person. 148 When the officer
reached in Duncan's pocket to retrieve the knife, he pulled out a
block of cocaine.149 The officer discovered a gun under the driver's
139. Wilder, 55 Va. App. at 590-91, 687 S.E.2d at 547 (quoting United States v. Ca-
dieux, 500 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2007)).
140. Id. at 593, 687 S.E.2d at 548-49.
141. Id. at 593-94, 687 S.E.2d at 549.
142. Id. at 593, 687 S.E.2d at 549.
143. Id. at 594, 687 S.E.2d at 549.
144. Duncan v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 175, 179, 684 S.E.2d 838, 840 (Ct. App.
2009).
145. Id. at 176, 684 S.E.2d at 839.
146. Id. at 177, 684 S.E.2d at 839.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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seat of the Ranger.5 0 A search of the remainder of the vehicle re-
vealed paraphernalia associated with the distribution of drugs.'"'
On appeal, the court of appeals assumed without deciding that
the search of the vehicle was not justified by the inventory search
exception or search incident to arrest.'52 The court held that the
search was justified by the automobile exception, given the de-
fendant's admission that a gun may be under the seat and the
presence of cocaine in his pocket.' The court of appeals rejected
Duncan's argument that the search was illegal under Arizona v.
Gant,"4 noting that, unlike Gant, in the instant case the police
had information regarding the vehicle independent of the status
of the defendant's license.15 Duncan's statement that there may
be a gun under the seat provided the officer with probable cause
to search the vehicle for evidence of a concealed weapon.156
B. Exigent Circumstances
The Court of Appeals of Virginia examined the issue of the ex-
igent circumstances necessary for a warrantless entry into a
home in West v. Commonwealth."7 West's elderly neighbor was
sexually assaulted by a man who illegally entered her home.1"
The victim told police that she had bitten her attacker's lip, ear,
and finger.' When the officer asked the victim if she could identi-
fy her assailant, she said she could not, but added that her neigh-
bor "Joe came to mind."160 She said that she did not believe Joe
could be her attacker because they had been neighbors for over
twenty years.'1'
Based on the victim's statements about "Joe," several police of-
ficers went to the home of her neighbor, Joseph West.'6 After
150. Id.
151. Id. at 177-78, 684 S.E.2d at 839.
152. Id. at 179, 684 S.E.2d at 840.
153. Id. at 179-80, 684 S.E.2d at 840-41.
154. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
155. Duncan, 55 Va. App. at 180-81, 684 S.E.2d at 841.
156. Id. at 181, 684 S.E.2d at 841.
157. 54 Va. App. 345, 352, 678 S.E.2d 856, 840 (Ct. App. 2009).
158. Id. at 350, 678 S.E.2d at 838-39.
159. Id., 678 S.E.2d at 839.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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answering the officers' knock, West hid behind the door so that
the police could not see his entire body.'6 When the officers saw
West's face, they saw his "lip was cut and had not scabbed
over."" West began to close the door.165 A detective stopped West
and told him that the police officers wanted to come into the
house.'6 6 West opened the door and the officers went in.167 Once
inside, the officers saw an injury to West's ear.'68 West, who was
wearing only underwear, was arrested.169 His mother brought him
a pair of jeans that had an apparent bloodstain on them.o70 The
police seized the jeans and took the defendant to the police sta-
tion. 71
The court of appeals agreed with the defendant that the police
needed both probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify
the warrantless entry into the home."7 The court concluded that
both probable cause and exigent circumstances existed, and af-
firmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.'7 With
regard to exigent circumstances, the court of appeals noted that
the police were investigating serious crimes, and thus the danger
to the community continued until the suspect was restrained.174
Furthermore, the defendant lived close to the victim's home,
could watch the police investigation, and thus could destroy evi-
dence or flee. 75 Finally, the case involved DNA evidence of a type
that is easily destroyed.176
C. Franks Hearings
A defendant can seek the exclusion of evidence obtained pur-
suant to a search warrant if the search warrant was issued based
163. Id. at 351, 678 S.E.2d at 839.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 352, 678 S.E.2d at 840.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 355, 678 S.E.2d at 841.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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upon deliberately false or misleading information."' To obtain a
Franks hearing, a defendant must "make[ ] a substantial prelimi-
nary showing that the affidavit for the search warrant contains
deliberately false or recklessly false misstatements or omissions
necessary to a finding of probable cause."78 Even then, before
holding a hearing, "the court is required to 'set to one side' the al-
leged false or reckless information or omission and determine
whether the warrant affidavit supports a finding of probable
cause."79
In Barnes v. Commonwealth, the defendant complained that
evidence seized during a search of his home must be suppressed
because the search warrant was based on a misleading affida-
vit.1o Specifically, in the affidavit in support of the search war-
rant, the detective omitted, among other things, the fact that one
of the witnesses to the shooting was unable to identify the defen-
dant from a photographic spread.'8' The warrant application did
note that two other witnesses identified the defendant and in-
cluded other details linking the defendant to the shooting.' 2 The
trial court held an evidentiary hearing after which the court con-
cluded that the warrant was based on probable cause. 83
The Supreme Court of Virginia observed that the trial court
awarded the defendant a Franks hearing without first making
"the defendant establish the requisite substantial preliminary
showing."16 The court held that a hearing under such circums-
tances is improper.' 8 Nevertheless, the court affirmed the holding
of the trial court, concluding that the extensive information truth-
fully conveyed in the affidavit established probable cause for the
search. 8 Barnes does not break new ground, but it serves as a
reminder of the sequence that must be followed in handling
Franks hearings.
177. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
178. Barnes v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 22, 33, 688 S.E.2d 210, 216 (2010).
179. Id. (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 156).
180. Id. at 25, 688 S.E.2d at 211-12.
181. Id. at 27-29, 688 S.E.2d at 213-14.
182. Id. at 29, 688 S.E.2d at 214.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 33, 688 S.E.2d at 216.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 34-35, 688 S.E.2d at 217.
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D. Plain View
In Cauls v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reversed the decision of the trial court denying Cauls's motion to
suppress the evidence seized from the pocket of his trousers.' 7 Po-
lice officers executed an arrest warrant for a probation violation
at Alexis Satkin's home. 8 Satkin was allowed to change her
clothes and an officer accompanied her into the home to do so.189
The officer saw a digital scale and white powder on the kitchen
table.90 Satkin did not give the officer consent to search the
home.19' The officer conducted a protective sweep of the home and
discovered Cauls lying in a bed.192 The officer told Cauls that a
search warrant was being obtained and that he was free to
leave. 9 3 When Cauls said that he was wearing only his under-
wear, the officer asked if Cauls wanted his pants.19 4 Cauls identi-
fied a pair of pants on the floor as his.19' When the officer picked
up the pants, he saw a knotted plastic bag protruding from the
pocket.'96 The officer removed the baggie and discovered contra-
band in it.'19
The court of appeals found that the "officer was entitled to con-
duct a 'protective sweep' of the residence" to ensure officer safe-
ty.'98 The officer did not restrain Cauls's movement, he merely re-
sponded to Cauls's request for pants.'99 The court, however, found
that the plain view exception did not apply and the officer lacked
probable cause to seize the baggie because its incriminating na-
ture was not apparent prior to pulling it out of the pocket.2 0' The
court held that the officer had "no more than an educated hunch"
187. 55 Va. App. 90, 104, 683 S.E.2d 847, 853 (Ct. App. 2009).
188. Id. at 94, 683 S.E.2d at 849.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 95, 683 S.E.2d at 849.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 96, 683 S.E.2d at 850 (quoting Maryland v. Bire, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990)).
199. Id. at 97, 683 S.E.2d at 850.
200. Id. at 102-03, 683 S.E.2d at 852-53.
2010]1 263
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
that the baggie in the pocket contained contraband and thus the
seizure was invalid. 201
E. Probable Cause
Suspects can refuse to perform field sobriety tests for a variety
of reasons. The issue in Jones v. Commonwealth was whether a
police officer could include this refusal in deciding whether prob-
able cause was present to arrest the suspect for driving under the
influence of alcohol.2 0 2 The Supreme Court of Virginia answered
this question with a qualified "yes." The court reasoned that such
evidence does "tend[ ] to show the driver's awareness that his
consumption of alcohol would affect his ability to perform such
tests," provided that other facts are present showing that a driver
consumed alcohol and that such consumption had a "discernable
effect ... on the driver's mental or physical state."0 3 Accordingly,
the court held that "a court may consider the driver's refusal to
perform field sobriety tests when such refusal is accompanied by
evidence of the driver's alcohol consumption and its discernable
effect on the driver's mental or physical state."204
As police departments equip their officers with more and more
technology, that technology can give the police an edge in appre-
hending criminals, but it also can give rise to Fourth Amendment
complications.
In another decision styled Jones v. Commonwealth, the defen-
dant was stopped when the police observed what they believed
was a sale of illegal drugs.205 Following the stop, the defendant
appeared nervous and did not produce a driver's license or a reg-
istration.206 Instead, he provided the police with a name and social
security number. 20 7 While this information was being verified, an
officer conducted a pat-down of the defendant during which the
officer seized the defendant's wallet. 208 Shortly afterward, the dis-
patcher informed the officers at the scene that the name and so-
201. Id. at 101, 683 S.E.2d at 852.
202. 279 Va. 52, 54, 688 S.E.2d 269, 270 (2010).
203. Id. at 58-59, 688 S.E.2d at 272-73.
204. Id. at 59, 688 S.E.2d at 272-73.
205. 279 Va. 665, 668, 691 S.E.2d 801, 802 (2010).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 669, 691 S.E.2d at 803.
208. Id.
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cial security number were "good."209 The defendant claimed that
he was illegally seized when the police impermissibly took his
wallet during a pat down search.-o After the wallet was taken,
the defendant gave the police consent to search his vehicle.21, The
search yielded firearms and heroin.2 12 This consent was invalid,
the defendant contended, because it was based upon a detention
that was improperly lengthened by the seizure of the wallet.' He
contended, therefore, that the evidence that was obtained follow-
ing this illegal seizure of his person should be suppressed.214
The Supreme Court of Virginia first agreed that the seizure of
the wallet was improper. 2 15 A pat down search is limited to remov-
ing weapons or items the officer recognizes as contraband under
the plain feel doctrine.216 The wallet does not fall under either cat-
egory and its seizure was, therefore, illegal. 2 17 That, however, did
not end the matter. The court observed that, notwithstanding the
seizure of the wallet, the defendant was properly being detained
because police were still attempting to determine his identity.2 8
The fact that the dispatcher confirmed that the name and social
security number the defendant verbally provided to the police did
not require an end to the detention.219 After all, a correct name
and social security number did not mean that the defendant was
this person.220 The officers could continue to detain the defendant
so that another officer with a computer could produce a photo-
graph and confirm that Jones was the person he claimed to be. 221
Consequently, "the temporary continued seizure of Jones did not
amount to an unlawful detention because determining Jones's
209. Id.
210. Id. at 671, 691 S.E.2d at 804.
211. Id. at 669-70, 691 S.E.2d at 803.
212. Id. at 670, 691 S.E.2d at 803.
213. Id. at 671, 691 S.E.2d at 804.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 672, 691 S.E.2d at 804.
216. Id. (quoting Grandison v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 316, 319-20, 645 S.E.2d 298,
300 (2007)).
217. Id. at 672, 691 S.E.2d at 804-05.
218. Id. at 674, 691 S.E.2d at 805.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id., 691 S.E.2d at 805-06.
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true identity was within the scope of the . . . investigatory stop
and was not unreasonable."222
IV. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A. Polygraph Evidence
Under settled Virginia law, polygraph evidence is not admissi-
ble in criminal trials due to its unreliability.223 The Supreme
Court of Virginia in Turner v. Commonwealth extended that rule
to probation revocation hearings. 2 24 The court rejected the argu-
ment that the "more relaxed" standard of admission in such hear-
ings warranted introduction of such evidence. 22 5 The court
stressed that its holding was limited to polygraph evidence itself
and that voluntary statements made by a probationer during a
polygraph test would be subject to ordinary rules of evidence. 226
B. Best Evidence
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Midkiff v. Commonwealth
rejected the defendant's argument that the best evidence rule
should be extended to digital images because such images could
be subjected to manipulation.227 Police seized the defendant's
computer and made copies of certain files containing child porno-
graphy.28 Some of the copied images and video recordings were
displayed at the trial.229 The court held that the best evidence rule
is limited to written documents and, further, based on the testi-
mony presented, the purpose of the rule, to ensure reliability of
the evidence, "is amply met in this case."230 According to the tes-
timony of the prosecution's expert, copies of a hard drive can be
222. Id., 691 S.E.2d at 806.
223. Billips v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 805, 809-10, 652 S.E.2d 99, 101-02 (2007).
224. 278 Va. 739, 745, 685 S.E.2d 665, 667 (2009).
225. Id. at 743, 685 S.E.2d at 667.
226. Id. at 743-44, 685 S.E.2d at 667-68.
227. 280 Va. 216, 219, 694 S.E.2d 576, 577 (2010).
228. Id. at 218, 694 S.E.2d at 577.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 219, 694 S.E.2d at 577-78.
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made without degradation and care and are "considered forensi-
cally to be an original."231
C. Prior Convictions
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed James Lester Waller's
conviction for possession of a firearm by a violent felon, based on
its finding that Waller's previous conviction orders were not prop-
erly authenticated at trial in the circuit court.232 Waller claimed
that a judicial signature was "[fjatally lacking .. . in the orders,
in the order book, or in an order recorded in the order book on the
last day of the term."233 Thus, he claimed, pursuant to Code sec-
tion 17.1-123(A), the orders were not authenticated, and there-
fore, were inadmissible. 2 34 The Commonwealth argued that, pur-
suant to Code section 8.01-389(A), records from any judicial
proceeding and any other official record of any court are authenti-
cated and certified by the clerk of court preserved to be a true
record.23 5
The court concluded that the two Code sections could be recon-
ciled. 236 Under Code section 8.01-389(A), the records of all judicial
proceedings, except for orders of circuit courts, are received as
prima facie evidence, while circuit court orders may be received
only when authenticated pursuant to Code section 17.1-123(A). 237
V. SENTENCING
A. Juvenile Sentencing
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Brown v. Commonwealth re-
solved whether juveniles convicted of possession of a firearm
should be sentenced to a mandatory minimum or whether the
231. Id. at 218, 694 S.E.2d at 577.
232. Waller v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 731, 735-38, 685 S.E.2d 48, 50-51 (2009).
233. Id. at 735, 685 S.E.2d at 50.
234. Id., 685 S.E.2d at 49-50.
235. Id. at 735-36, 685 S.E.2d at 50.
236. Id. at 737, 685 S.E.2d at 51.
237. Id. (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-389(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010);
id. § 17.1-123(A) (Repl. Vol. 2010)). Waller had confessed to law enforcement and testified
under oath that he had been convicted of a felony. Id. at 738, 685 S.E.2d at 51. The su-
preme court thus reversed and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing on the
lesser offense of possession of a firearm by a nonviolent felon. Id.
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court retains discretion in sentencing them as juveniles.238 The de-
fendant used a firearm in the commission of robbery.3 9 Code sec-
tion 18.2-53.1 specifies that a defendant who is convicted of the
offense "shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of im-
prisonment of three years for a first conviction, and to a manda-
tory minimum term of five years for a second or subsequent con-
viction."240 Brown argued that this provision did not apply, and
that he should instead be sentenced under Code section 16.1-
272(A)(2). 24 1 That provision affords courts discretion in sentencing
juveniles, and permits a court to sentence a juvenile tried as an
adult to a juvenile disposition. 242 The court found that the more
specific statute, section 18.2-53.1, controlled over the more gener-
al statute.243 Therefore, the court of appeals correctly determined
that the trial court erred in failing to sentence the defendant to a
mandatory minimum term of incarceration. 244
B. Revocation of Suspended Sentences
In Mohamed v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virgin-
ia addressed a claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to re-
voke a suspended sentence because it entered its order of revoca-
tion too late.245 The court of appeals discussed at length the
different types of jurisdiction.246 The court determined that the
"circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the ... revoca-
tion hearing because the General Assembly has granted that
court subject matter jurisdiction over the specific class of cases of
which the" instant case is an example. 247 The court of appeals
noted that the authority to exercise jurisdiction is distinct from
subject matter jurisdiction. 248 The court described the authority to
exercise jurisdiction as the 'conditions of fact that must exist ...
as the prerequisites of the authority of the court to proceed to
238. 279 Va. 210, 213, 688 S.E.2d 185, 187 (2010).
239. Id. at 214, 688 S.E.2d at 187.
240. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-53.1 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Supp. 2010).
241. Brown, 279 Va. at 220, 688 S.E.2d at 191.
242. § 16.1-272(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
243. Brown, 279 Va. at 223, 688 S.E.2d at 192.
244. Id. at 224, 688 S.E.2d at 193.
245. 56 Va. App. 95, 97, 691 S.E.2d 513, 514 (Ct. App. 2010).
246. See id. at 98-102, 691 S.E.2d at 514-16.
247. Id. at 100, 691 S.E.2d at 515.
248. Id. at 101, 691 S.E.2d at 516 (citing Nelson v. Warden, 262 Va. 276, 281, 552
S.E.2d 73, 75 (2001)).
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judgment or decree."' 249 Passage of time can be such a condition.250
However, because Mohamed did not raise the issue at trial, it was
defaulted pursuant to Rule 5A:18. 25 1 The court of appeals rejected
Mohamed's request to invoke the ends of justice exception to that
rule.252 The court noted that Mohamed never fulfilled the restitu-
tion requirement of his probation and that probation had in fact
been extended indefinitely at an earlier revocation hearing.253
C. Sentences in Excess of the Statutory Maximum
In Rawls v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered what to do when a defendant is sentenced by a jury in
excess of the range permitted by statute. 254 Rawls was convicted of
second degree murder.255 The jury was erroneously instructed on
the range of punishment and imposed a sentence of twenty-five
years in prison. 25 6 The actual maximum sentence at the time was
twenty years."' The court cast aside existing precedent it charac-
terized as lacking in uniformity in favor of a bright line rule.256 A
sentence in violation of the authorized range of punishment, the
court held, is void ab initio.259 When that occurs, the defendant
will be entitled to a new sentencing hearing.260 The court reasoned
that this procedure obviates speculation concerning what pu-
nishment the jury might have inflicted had it known the correct
range of punishment and protects the right to trial by jury.2 61
249. Id. (quoting Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 228, 661 S.E.2d 415, 426
(2008)).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 102, 691 S.E.2d at 516.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 103, 691 S.E.2d at 516-17.
254. 278 Va. 213, 215, 683 S.E.2d 544, 545 (2009).
255. Id., 638 S.E.2d at 546.
256. Id. at 221, 638 S.E.2d at 549.
257. Id. at 215, 683 S.E.2d at 546.
258. Id. at 220-21, 683 S.E.2d at 548-49.
259. Id. at 221, 683 S.E.2d at 549. The court's characterization of the issue as one of
subject matter jurisdiction and its rejection of the Commonwealth's procedural default ar-
guments suggests that procedural default rules will not apply in this situation. See id. at
217-18, 683 S.E.2d at 547. If that is so, then both the defendant and the Commonwealth
could, at any time, raise the issue of a sentence that is either below or in excess of the pre-
scribed statutory range.
260, Id. at 221, 683 S.E.2d at 549.
261. Id.
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VI. SPECIFIC CRIMES
A. Assault
The Court of Appeals of Virginia in Hodnett v. Commonwealth
addressed whether a defendant's actions constituted one or sev-
eral assaults.262 While in his cell at the local jail, Hodnett called
over one of the correctional officers.263 He then reached into the
toilet with a plastic cup, retrieved pieces of toilet paper and feces,
and flung them at the officer. 2 64 The contents of the cup struck the
officer in the chest.26 ' Hodnett then reached into the toilet again,
and this time threw the contents of the cup on the officer's face.266
Hodnett argued that his actions were "component parts of a sin-
gle assaultive act."267 The court of appeals disagreed.268 The court
reasoned that the trial court found each throw to be a "separate,
complete act."269 Such a determination is a question of fact, bind-
ing on appeal unless plainly wrong.27 0 The court observed that the
injury was complete each time the thrown material hit the offic-
er.27 1 Each act involved "a new formation and execution of pur-
pose."2 72 Future cases will reveal whether this reasoning will be
applied to, for example, a distinct punch or kick.
In Clark v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia af-
firmed the defendant's conviction for assault of her son's school
bus driver.273 The defendant placed her car in the bus circle dur-
ing the morning bus drop off.2 74 She approached the victim's bus
on foot and threatened to get the victim and "f " her up, prom-
ising to do so wherever the victim went. 275 When the victim drove
262. 56 Va. App. 235, 235-36, 692 S.E.2d 647, 647 (Ct. App. 2010).
263. Id. at 236, 692 S.E.2d at 647.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 236, 692 S.E.2d at 648.
268. Id. at 237-38, 692 S.E.2d at 648.
269. Id. at 237, 692 S.E.2d at 648.
270. Id. (quoting Glasco v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 763, 774, 497 S.E.2d 150, 155
(Ct. App. 1998)).
271. Id. at 237, 692 S.E.2d at 648.
272. Id. at 238, 692 S.E.2d at 648.
273. 279 Va. 636, 643, 691 S.E.2d 786, 790 (2010). The defendant's son had been barred
from riding the bus. Id. at 638, 691 S.E.2d at 787.
274. Id. at 638-39, 691 S.E.2d at 787.
275. Id. at 639, 691 S.E.2d at 787.
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her bus for the afternoon bus run that same day, Clark again was
waiting for her.2 76 Clark again approached the bus and reminded
the victim that she had said she would "get" the victim277
The supreme court identified the relevant question in the case
as "whether Clark committed an overt act with the intent to place
[the victim] in fear or apprehension of bodily harm."278 The court
held that, viewing Clark's words and actions in her afternoon ap-
proach of the bus in the context of her earlier threat to the victim,
the defendant's afternoon approach "was an act sufficient to
create a reasonable apprehension on the part of [the victim] that
she was about to be attacked."2 79
B. Assault by Mob
The defendant in Hamilton v. Commonwealth challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence for his three convictions for assault by
mob.28 0 The first of these assaults took place when a dozen mem-
bers of a gang attacked an individual at a party.281 During the as-
sault, the defendant was seen "doing something with his hands
around the middle of [the victim's] back but was not rendering
assistance to" the victim." 2 The victim suffered cigarette burns on
his back. 283 The defendant was wearing red, the color of the
Bloods gang members involved in the attack.284 With respect to
the attack on the victim who suffered cigarette burns, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held that the evidence, although conflict-
ing, was clear that the attack was the work of a mob and the evi-
dence further supported the conclusion that the defendant was a
member of that mob.28 6
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 642, 691 S.E.2d at 789. The court noted that Virginia, like many jurisdic-
tions, has merged the common law crime of assault with the common law tort. Id. at 641,
691 S.E.2d at 789 (citing Carter v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 44, 46-47, 606 S.E.2d 839, 841
(2005)).
279. Id. at 643, 691 S.E.2d at 790.
280. 279 Va. 94, 102, 688 S.E.2d 168, 173 (2010).
281. Id. at 99-100, 688 S.E.2d at 171-72.
282. Id. at 100, 688 S.E.2d at 172.
283. Id. at 99, 688 S.E.2d at 172.
284, Id., 688 S.E.2d at 171.
285. Id. at 104-05, 688 S.E.2d at 174-75.
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Two other individuals at this party were struck in the head
with tiki torches by a single assailant.2"6 During these attacks, "a
lot of people were wearing red," were flashing gang signs with
their hands, and were saying "Blood-at."287 "The term 'Blood-[a]t'
is a 'Blood war cry' used to call members of the gang to 'converge'
and 'provide whatever . .. assistance is required."'" 88 Someone
handed a gun to another individual, saying, "Kill that mother-
f ker."289 These facts supported the factfinder's conclusion that
the assaults were the work of a mob, and that it was the same
mob that perpetrated both assaults. 290 Moreover, the evidence, the
court held, supported the conclusion that the defendant was a
member of that mob.291 He wore red, the color of the gang perpe-
trating the assault, he admitted to exchanging words with one of
the victims who was assaulted with a tiki torch, and further ad-
mitted to pointing a gun at one of these victims. 292
C. Attempted Robbery
In Rogers v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
addressed the requirements necessary to prove an attempted
crime.292 An attempted crime is comprised of "'the intent to com-
mit the crime and the doing of some direct act toward its con-
summation, but falling short of the accomplishment of the ulti-
mate design.' 294
The defendant and two confederates planned to rob the resi-
dents of an apartment in Arlington. 295 The men were armed with
guns. 29 6 The defendant put a bandana over his face to hide his
identity as the men approached the front door of the apartment. 297
One of the men rang the doorbell of the chosen apartment, but no
286. Id. at 101-02, 688 S.E.2d at 173.
287. Id. at 101, 688 S.E.2d at 173.
288. Id. at 98, 688 S.E.2d at 171.
289. Id. at 105, 688 S.E.2d at 175.
290. Id. at 104-06, 688 S.E.2d at 175.
291. Id. at 105, 688 S.E.2d at 175.
292. Id. at 107-08, 688 S.E.2d at 176.
293. 55 Va. App. 20, 24-25, 683 S.E.2d 311, 313 (Ct. App. 2009).
294. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 291, 293, 163 S.E.2d 570, 573
(1968)).
295. Id. at 23, 683 S.E.2d at 312-13.
296. Id., 683 S.E.2d at 313.
297. Id.
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one answered the door.298 In fact, a resident of the home looked
through the peephole of the door, saw the men and the weapons,
and directed another resident to call the police. 2 99
In affirming the conviction for attempted robbery, the court of
appeals held that the men prepared for the crime and "actually
began the robbery."00 The court held that "[t]he intervention of an
external factor, such as a victim's refusal to cooperate by opening
the door, does not somehow absolve a defendant of attempting to
commit a crime," but only frustrates the completion of the
crime."o'
D. Criminal Contempt
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and vacated criminal
contempt convictions for two attorneys in Singleton v. Common-
wealth.302 In each case, the lawyer had contacted the prosecutor
assigned to his client's criminal case prior to the court date and
counsel and the prosecutor had agreed that the case would be
continued.30 Although the court had not entered orders continu-
ing the cases, defense counsel in each case excused the client from
appearing on the originally scheduled court date.30 In each case,
the lawyer was held in contempt."' The supreme court reversed
the convictions because the records in the cases failed to demon-
strate an intent by the attorneys to "obstruct or interrupt the
administration of justice," as required by Code section 18.2-
456(1) .30
E. Credit Card Fraud
Many employers allow their employees to use corporate credit
cards. To convict for credit card fraud, it is not enough to prove
that the defendant used his employer's credit card for personal
298. Id.
299. Id. at 22, 683 S.E.2d at 312.
300. Id. at 27, 683 S.E.2d at 315.
301. Id. at 29, 683 S.E.2d at 315.
302. 278 Va. 542, 552, 685 S.E.2d 668, 674 (2009).
303. Id. at 545, 547, 685 S.E.2d at 670, 671.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 546, 547, 685 S.E.2d at 670, 671.
306. Id. at 551, 685 S.E.2d at 673 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-456(1) (Repl. Vol.
2009 & Cum. Supp. 2010)).
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purchases. 0 As the Court of Appeals of Virginia held in Saponaro
v. Commonwealth, if the defendant made unauthorized purchases
while in lawful possession of the credit card the defendant is not
guilty of credit card fraud.30 Kovalaske v. Commonwealth309 offers
a useful counterpoint to Saponaro. In Kovaleske, the defendant
was entrusted with a credit card on two occasions for the limited
purpose of making specific purchases.310 The defendant later took
the credit card from his employer's truck and purchased items for
his own use.3 1' The credit card was recovered from the defendant's
person.3 12 The Court of Appeals of Virginia distinguished Sapona-
ro, noting that, in Kovalaske, the defendant "did not misuse his
employer's credit card while it was in his lawful possession; ap-
pellant misused [his employer's] credit card while it was in his
wrongful possession."3 13
F. Drugs
In Herron v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
addressed both the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a violation
of Code section 53.1-203(5) and Herron's claim that his conviction
violated the Fifth Amendment. 31
Police arrested Herron on an outstanding warrant for assault
and battery, and he denied having any contraband on his per-
son.315 The search incident to arrest was interrupted by Herron's
conduct.3'6 Immediately prior to entry into the jail, the officer
again asked him if he had any contraband on his person, and ad-
vised him that it was an additional offense to take an illegal sub-
stance into the jail.317 Herron denied having any drugs.' A strip
307. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-195(b)(i) (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Supp. 2010) (defining credit
card fraud as, among other things, obtaining goods or services by representing oneself as
the holder of a credit card number without consent of the cardholder).
308. 51 Va. App. 149, 152-53, 655 S.E.2d 49, 50-51 (Ct. App. 2008).
309. 56 Va. App. 224, 692 S.E.2d 641 (Ct. App. 2010).
310. Id. at 227, 692 S.E.2d at 643.
311. Id. at 227-28, 692 S.E.2d at 643.
312. Id. at 228, 692 S.E.2d at 643-44.
313. Id. at 232-33, 692 S.E.2d at 646.
314. 55 Va. App. 691, 694, 688 S.E.2d 901, 902 (Ct. App. 2010).
315. Id., 688 S.E.2d at 902-03.
316. Id. at 695, 688 S.E.2d at 903.
317. Id.
318. Id.
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search at the jail revealed a baggy of cocaine between Herron's
buttocks.-"
The court of appeals rejected Herron's argument that the evi-
dence failed to establish that he intended to bring drugs into the
jail.3 20 The court found that the statute does not require proof of
intent, but rather is a strict liability statute.3 2 1 Relying on author-
ity from other jurisdictions, the court of appeals held that the on-
ly voluntary act required is entry into the jail knowing that one is
carrying contraband.322
The court of appeals also rejected Herron's contention that the
application of Code section 53.1-203(5) violated Herron's Fifth
Amendment rights because "he was faced with the choice of ei-
ther admitting to the criminal act of possessing cocaine or facing
a further charge of possessing contraband inside a correctional
facility."32> The court noted that the "'Fifth Amendment does not
insulate a defendant from all difficult choices that are presented
during the course of criminal proceedings."'324 The court concluded
that Herron was not compelled to incriminate himself, but made
the choice to not disclose the drugs he had on his person. 325 While
he was undoubtedly presented with a dilemma, it was a dilemma
of his own making, and thus no constitutional violation oc-
curred.326
G. Escape
The defendant in Thomas v. Commonwealth was charged with
escape from custody on a felony charge.3 2 7 He had been arrested
on suspicion of dealing marijuana, but broke free from the offic-
er's custody." The key issue was whether he, in the words of the
statute, had been taken into custody on a "charge of criminal of-
319. Id.
320. Id. at 696, 701, 688 S.E.2d at 903, 906.
321. Id. at 698, 688 S.E.2d at 904-05.
322. Id. at 700-01, 688 S.E.2d at 905-06.
323. Id. at 701-02, 688 S.E.2d at 906.
324. Id. at 702, 688 S.E.2d at 906 (quoting Doss v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 679,
687, 479 S.E.2d 92, 96-97 (Ct. App. 1996)).
325. Id. at 704, 688 S.E.2d at 907.
326. Id.
327. 56 Va. App. 1, 1, 690 S.E.2d 298, 298 (Ct. App. 2010).
328. Id. at 3-4, 690 S.E.2d at 299.
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fense."329 A charge, the Court of Appeals of Virginia explained, is a
"formal written complaint" or a "formal accusation of an of-
fense."330 Thomas was arrested, but not "charged" as the statute
contemplates.33 Therefore, the court reversed his conviction.332
Remarkably, the court invoked the ends of justice exception to the
rule of procedural default to reach this outcome, noting that the
record affirmatively showed that an element of the offense did not
occur.333
I. Larceny
Establishing the value of stolen items can be treacherous ter-
rain for prosecutors. In Baylor v. Commonwealth, the defendant
was investigated in a case of several stolen catalytic converters.334
He challenged the evidence used by the prosecution to prove that
the value of the stolen items exceeded $200.335 Several witnesses
called by the prosecution testified that the replacement cost for
the converters ranged from $400 to $2200 for each converter.336
The Court of Appeals of Virginia first observed that "where an
item has no market value, the actual value must be shown."33 1 In
this instance, the parties were in agreement that there was no
market for catalytic converters as auto parts.3 8 Therefore, the
prosecution was required to show actual value.339 The court ob-
served that establishing the replacement cost is not the same as
establishing the actual value of the items at the time of the
theft.3 o Furthermore, no evidence was presented about their
329. Id. at 6, 690 S.E.2d at 300 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-479(B) (Repl. Vol.
2009)).
330. Id. (quoting Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 292, 296, 661 S.E.2d 464, 467
(2008)).
331. Id. at 7, 690 S.E.2d at 301.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 5, 690 S.E.2d at 300.
334. 55 Va. App. 82, 84, 683 S.E.2d 843, 844 (Ct. App. 2009).
335. Id. at 86, 683 S.E.2d at 845.
336. Id. at 88-89, 683 S.E.2d at 846.
337. Id. at 88, 683 S.E.2d at 845 (emphasis omitted) (quoting DiMaio v. Common-
wealth, 46 Va. App. 755, 764, 621 S.E.2d 696, 701 (Ct. App. 2005)).
338. Id., 683 S.E.2d at 845-46.
339. Id. (citing Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688, 692, 232 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1977)).
340. Id. at 89, 683 S.E.2d at 846.
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value as scrap.341 The replacement value evidence, therefore, fell
short of establishing the value of the items. 342
The court cautioned, however, that replacement cost can be re-
levant in some situations. The court noted that for items that ap-
preciate rather than depreciate, replacement cost may be rele-
vant.343 Moreover, for some items that are recent or of a particular
character, replacement cost will be tantamount to actual value or
fair market value.344 But
where, as here, there is an absence of evidence linking replacement
value to an accurate determination of actual or fair market value,
mere evidence of replacement value alone is insufficient as a matter
of law to support an inference by the fact finder that the value of sto-
len property necessarily exceeds the statutory threshold. 34 5
The supreme court affirmed a conviction for grand larceny in
Carter v. Commonwealth, where the defendant and his confede-
rate, Browning, attempted to obtain a refund from a home im-
provement store for buckets of paint that neither had pur-
chased. 46
Carter entered the store and put several buckets of paint in a
shopping cart. 47 He and Browning took the paint to the return
desk and sought a refund for the listed price of the paint.348 The
store employee did not give a refund, but called the loss preven-
tion officer .349The supreme court rejected Carter's claim that the
evidence was insufficient to show that he intended to steal the
paint."'o The court held that conduct of a customer in moving mer-
chandise, "which makes the customer's possession [of the mer-
chandise] clearly adverse to the store," constitutes a "trespassory
taking."5'1 One may take another's property by trespass even
though he has not removed it from the premises or presence of
341. Id. at 88 n.5, 683 S.E.2d at 846 n.5.
342. Id. at 90, 683 S.E.2d at 847.
343. Id. at 89-90, 683 S.E.2d at 846.
344. Id. at 90, 683 S.E.2d at 846.
345. Id., 683 S.E.2d at 846-47.
346. 280 Va. 100, 103, 694 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 108, 694 S.E.2d at 595.
351. Id. at 106, 694 S.E.2d at 594 (citing Freeman v. Meijer, Inc., 291 N.W.2d 87, 89
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980)).
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the owner.35 2 The court held that at the moment ownership of the
paint was asserted "there was evidence that Carter and his ac-
complice had taken the store's paint just the same as if they had
walked out of the store with that paint," and concluded that the
"conduct establishe[d] sufficient possession to constitute larce-
ny."353
J. Forcible Sodomy
In Sanford v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
affirmed the defendant's conviction for forcible (oral) sodomy
through the use of the victim's mental incapacity, pursuant to
Code section 18.2-67.1(A)(2).3 54 The defendant did not deny that
an act of sodomy occurred, but challenged the proof of the mental
incapacity of the sixteen-year-old victim. 355 The court noted that
"it is the confluence of IQ (or mental age) and adaptive skills that
are relevant to the establishment of mental incapacity."56 In this
case, the victim, who had an IQ of forty-six and lacked the ability
to assess cause and effect relationships was closer to severe than
mild mental retardation. 7 She could only perform basic hygiene
tasks, if reminded, and needed constant adult supervision.3 58 She
had had no education as to "oral sex."319 The court of appeals con-
cluded the evidence was sufficient to prove that she lacked the
mental capacity to understand "the nature or consequences" of
the act of sodomy.so
K. Receiving Stolen Property
The defendant in Whitehead v. Commonwealth shared an
apartment with the father of her child.361 She told the police she
352. Id. (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 19.2(i), at 979 (5th ed. 2010)).
353. Id. at 107, 694 S.E.2d at 595 (citing Welch v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 518,
524, 425 S.E.2d 101, 105 (Ct. App. 1992)).
354. 54 Va. App. 357, 358-59, 678 S.E.2d 842, 843 (Ct. App. 2009).
355. Id. at 362, 678 S.E.2d at 844-45.
356. Id. at 364, 678 S.E.2d at 845.
357. Id. at 360-61, 678 S.E.2d at 843-44.
358. Id. at 361, 678 S.E.2d at 844.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 365, 678 S.E.2d at 846 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.10(3) (Repl. Vol.
2009 & Supp. 2010) (defining "mental incapacity")).
361. 278 Va. 105, 108-09, 684 S.E.2d 577, 578-79 (2009).
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knew this man was stealing and using the proceeds from the
thefts to support her and her child. 62 The defendant was con-
victed of receiving stolen property on the theory of constructive
receipt because she benefitted from the proceeds of the theft."'
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the defendant that
the evidence was insufficient to establish a "receipt" of stolen
property.3 64 The court observed that it had never accepted the
theory of constructive possession.3 65 The defendant did not 're-
ceive[ ]' the property merely because she benefitted from the
proceeds of its sale."366
L. Involuntary Manslaughter
The supreme court addressed the issue of proximate cause for
involuntary manslaughter in Brown v. Commonwealth.367 A police
officer signaled Brown to stop his vehicle, and Brown initially
complied with the direction.366 However, when the officer ap-
proached the driver's window, Brown drove away at a very high
rate of speed, passing within five feet of the officer.369 Another of-
ficer pursued Brown's vehicle, which was traveling far in excess
of the speed limit.37 0 When this second officer swerved to avoid col-
liding with a vehicle not involved in the chase, the officer struck
yet another uninvolved car, killing the driver.371
On appeal, Brown complained that his actions did not directly
cause the death, and argued that the victim died solely because
the officer decided "to continue the high speed chase into a popu-
lated area."372 In addressing Brown's claim, the supreme court
reaffirmed that "[a] proximate cause is 'an act or omission that, in
natural and continuous sequence unbroken by a superseding
cause, produces a particular event and without which that event
362. Id. at 109, 684 S.E.2d at 578.
363. Id. at 112, 684 S.E.2d at 580.
364. Id. at 113, 684 S.E.2d at 581.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. 278 Va. 523, 526, 685 S.E.2d 43, 44 (2009).
368. Id.
369. Id., 685 S.E.2d at 44-45.
370. Id., 685 S.E.2d at 45.
371. Id. at 527, 685 S.E.2d at 45.
372. Id.
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would not have occurred."'"" Because an incident can have more
than one proximate cause, each actor whose conduct is a prox-
imate cause is criminally liable "unless the causal chain is broken
by a superseding act that becomes the sole cause of the death."374
Here, the officer who struck the victim acted in direct response to
Brown's decision to flee from the first officer.3" Brown continued
to drive dangerously in excess of the speed limit, knowing that
the police were chasing him.376 The court concluded that his ac-
tions constituted a proximate cause of the death and affirmed his
involuntary manslaughter conviction.37
M. Obscene Telephone Call
After an altercation with his girlfriend, the defendant in Lofg-
ren v. Commonwealth called her over the telephone and, rather
than whisper sweet nothings to win her back, adopted a different
strategy.378 He told her, "I can't believe you f ing c_ . . . You're
a fucking bitch ... I hate you . .. I can't believe you're doing this.
[W]e had plans."379 For good measure, he left an additional mes-
sage again calling her a "f ing c_" and saying "you f ing
suck."38o For these outbursts, the defendant was convicted of us-
ing, over the telephone, "obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd, lascivious
language" with the intent to harass or intimidate."' The court re-
versed the conviction. 38 2 To be convicted under section 18.2-427,
the speech must be "obscene."3 83 Although the words the defen-
dant used "can have sexual connotations when utilized in certain
contexts," the Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded that he did
not use them so as to "'appeal to the prurient interest in sex,"' nor
did he go "'substantially beyond the customary limits of candor in
373. Id. at 529, 685 S.E.2d at 46 (quoting Williams v. Joynes, 278 Va. 57, 62, 677
S.E.2d 261, 264 (2009)).
374. Id.
375. Id. at 530, 685 S.E.2d at 47.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 530-31, 685 S.E.2d at 47-48.
378. 55 Va. App. 116, 684 S.E.2d 223 (Ct. App. 2009).
379. Id. at 118, 684 S.E.2d at 224.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 118, 684 S.E.2d at 225 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-427 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
382. Id. at 117, 684 S.E.2d at 225.
383. See Perkins v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 7, 14, 402 S.E.2d 229, 233 (Ct. App.
1991) (limiting the reach of Code section 18.2-427 to "obscene" speech).
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description or representation of such matters."'"84 Instead, he
"used the offensive words as vulgar curse or swear words to com-
municate his frustration, anger, contempt or disgust with the vic-
tim after the incident."385 Because the speech was not obscene, the
defendant could not be convicted under the statute. 386 Cases such
as Lofgren illustrate the difficulty of obtaining a conviction under
this statute.
N. Obstruction of Justice
The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the conviction for ob-
struction of justice pursuant to Code section 18.2-460(B) in Testa
v. Commonwealth.3 7 When police officers arrived to investigate a
complaint of domestic violence between Testa and his girlfriend
at the home Testa shared with his stepfather, the girlfriend's fa-
ther met the officers and told them that Testa was armed and
dangerous.' The officers were aware that Testa had recently as-
saulted other sheriffs deputies.389
Testa's stepfather admitted the police into the home, where
Testa had locked himself into a bedroom.3 10 One of the officers
asked Testa to come out of the room so he could hear Testa's side
of the story.39' He responded to the officer with a vile suggestion
and then said that he would pick the officers off "one by one."3 "
Testa added that if he was going back to jail he was going to bring
them down with him.393 He also made threatening comments con-
cerning the girlfriend and her family.394
The court of appeals held that under the plain wording of Code
section 18.2-460(B), the crime of obstruction of justice involves
"merely an attempt to intimidate or impede the officer with either
384. Lofgren, 55 Va. App. at 121, 684 S.E.2d at 226 (quoting obscenity definition found
in VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-372 (Supp. 2010)).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 122, 684 S.E.2d at 226.
387. 55 Va. App. 275, 285, 685 S.E.2d 213, 217-18 (Ct. App. 2009).
388. Id. at 279, 685 S.E.2d at 215.
389. Id. at 279-80, 685 S.E.2d at 215.
390. Id. at 280, 685 S.E.2d at 215.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
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threats or force."95 The court concluded that there was ample evi-
dence that Testa attempted to intimidate the officers with threats
of violence.39 6
0. Reckless Driving
In Chibikom v. Commonwealth, after parsing the elements of
improper driving9 7 and reckless driving by speed,"' the court of
appeals concluded that improper driving is not a lesser-included
offense of reckless driving by speed.39 Thus, the court of appeals
concluded that the trial court did not err in refusing the defen-
dant's tendered instruction, which would have allowed the jury to
convict the defendant charged with the reckless offense of impro-
per driving.400
The court of appeals held that "[e]very commission of reckless
driving by speed does not also constitute a commission of impro-
per driving. In addition, improper driving is not composed entire-
ly of the elements of reckless driving by speed."401 The court noted
that the improper driving statute contained a culpability re-
quirement that the strict liability reckless driving by speed sta-
tute did not.402 The court further noted that, pursuant to the im-
proper driving statute, only the prosecutor, or a court, as opposed
to a jury, may reduce a reckless driving charge to improper driv-
ing.403
P. Robbery
In Williams v. Commonwealth, the court concluded that what
began as a larceny escalated into a robbery.-o' A group of young
men were skateboarding at an abandoned dealership when they
were approached by three men, including the defendant.405 Fol-
395. Id. at 285, 685 S.E.2d at 218.
396. Id.
397. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-869 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
398. See § 46.2-862 (Repl. Vol. 2010).
399. 54 Va. App. 422, 426, 680 S.E.2d 295, 297 (Ct. App. 2009).
400. Id. at 424-25, 680 S.E.2d at 296.
401. Id. at 426, 680 S.E.2d at 297.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 427, 680 S.E.2d at 297.
404. 278 Va. 633, 637, 685 S.E.2d 178, 180 (2009).
405. Id. at 635, 685 S.E.2d at 179.
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lowing an exchange of taunts, one of the skateboarders noticed
that his cellular phone, which had been sitting on a ledge, was
missing.406 He demanded that the defendant return the phone, but
the defendant refused.407 The defendant produced a black, flat ob-
ject from his pocket that the victim thought might be a gun.408 The
defendant asked if they "had a problem."0 9 The victim abandoned
his attempt to recover the telephone.410 The Supreme Court of
Virginia sustained the defendant's conviction for robbery.411 The
court explained that when he initially took the phone, the defen-
dant committed a larceny.412 Larceny is a continuing offense.413
When the victim asked for the return of his property, and the de-
fendant responded by "introduc[ing] the threat of force or violence
by reaching into his waistband, showing a 'flat, black object' and
asking if Fox and Brown 'had a problem,' his offense matured into
robbery."414
Q. Trespass
The facts in Baker v. Commonwealth established that the de-
fendant was present on "posted" property.415 He challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence, contending that the prosecution had
failed to prove that the signs had been posted by "the owner, les-
see, custodian or other person lawfully in charge of the proper-
ty."416 The trespass statute provides in relevant part that
If any person without authority of law goes upon or remains upon
the lands, buildings or premises of another, or any portion or area
thereof, after having been forbidden to do so, either orally or in writ-
ing, by the owner, lessee, custodian or other person lawfully in charge
thereof, or after having been forbidden to do so by a sign or signs
posted by such persons or by the holder of any easement or other
right-of-way authorized by the instrument creating such interest to
post such signs on such lands, structures, premises or portion or area
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 640, 685 S.E.2d at 182.
412. Id. at 638, 685 S.E.2d at 181.
413. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 267 Va. 284, 287, 591 S.E.2d 68, 70 (2009)).
414. Id. at 639, 685 S.E.2d at 181.
415. 278 Va. 656, 659, 685 S.E.2d 661, 663 (2009).
416. Id. at 661-62, 685 S.E.2d at 664.
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thereof at a place or places where it or they may be reasonably
seen, . . . he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.4 1 7
Construing this language, the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
cluded that
the plain language of Code § 18.2-119 requires proof, as an element
of the crime of trespass, that oral or written notice of the proscrip-
tion against entry be given or a "no trespassing" sign be posted by
the owner, lessee, custodian, or other person lawfully in charge of
the property, or by the holder of an easement or other right-of-way
who was authorized to post such a sign by the instrument creating
that person's interest in the property.
Because the prosecution failed to present any evidence that the
signs on the property were posted by one of the persons enume-
rated in the statute, the court dismissed the conviction.419
VII. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Due to the difficult budget situation, legislative changes were
limited this year.
The most significant legislative changes came in a special ses-
sion called in response to the United States Supreme Court's de-
cision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.40 The General Assem-
bly enacted a new "notice and demand" statute42 1 along the lines
of what the Melendez-Diaz Court signaled would be acceptable
under the Confrontation Clause.422
The General Assembly resurrected the anti-spam statute,
which had been invalidated on First Amendment grounds in
Jaynes v. Commonwealth.423 The new statute applies only to
commercial electronic mail, rather than to all electronic mail.424
417. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-119 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
418. Baker, 278 Va. at 662, 685 S.E.2d at 664.
419. Id. at 663, 685 S.E.2d at 665.
420. 557 U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (holding that certificates of analysis are tes-
timonial statements covered by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause).
421. Act of Aug. 21, 2009, ch. 1, 2010 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended in scattered
sections of VA. CODE ANN.).
422. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at_, 129 S. Ct. at 2541.
423. See 276 Va. 443, 464, 666 S.E.2d 303, 314 (2008).
424. Act of Apr. 11, 2010, ch. 489, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-152.2, -152.3:1 (Supp. 2010)).
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Any person who is authorized to possess a firearm is now ex-
pressly exempted from the prohibition on concealed weapons,
provided that it is a handgun "possessed while in a personal, pri-
vate motor vehicle or vessel and such handgun is secured in a
container or compartment in the vehicle or vessel."425 This statu-
tory change overturns the result in Leith v. Commonwealth.2 6
The exception applies only to the prohibition on carrying a con-
cealed weapon found in Code section 18.2-308.427 It does not apply
to other prohibitions on firearms, such as possessing a firearm
with the intent to distribute drugs.428
425. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308(A), -308(B)(10) (Supp. 2010).
426. See 17 Va. App. 620, 621, 440 S.E.2d 152, 153 (Ct. App. 1994) (upholding convic-
tion for possessing a concealed weapon when weapon was located in a locked console in-
side the vehicle).
427. See § 18.2-308(B) (Supp. 2010).
428. Id. § 18.2-308.4 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Supp. 2010).
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